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THE RELATION OF THE EQUITY ADMINIS-
TERED BY THE COMMON LAW JUDGES
TO THE EQUITY ADMINISTERED BY
THE CHANCELLOR'
For some time past evidence has been accumulating that, in
the twelfth, thirteenth and the early years of the fourteenth cen-
turies, the tribunals which developed into the common law courts
and the courts of the itinerant judges administered both law and
equity. It may perhaps be said that this statement involves an
anachronism, because, by making use of the modem technical
terms "law" and "equity," modem ideas and distinctions are
read into mediaeval phenomena, to which these ideas and dis-
tinctions were unknown. Such a criticism would be partially,
but not wholly true. In the course of the thirteenth century the
courts of common law, and the law which they administered,
had acquired so many of their permanently distinctive character-
istics, that it is possible to differentiate the large number of
cases in which these characteristics occur, from the compara-
tively small number of cases in which an appeal is made to
' The chief authorities are Bigelow, History of Procedure, 192-6;
Holmes, Early English Equity, i LAw QuART. REv. 162-174; Eyre of
Kent (Selden Society), Vol. II., Introd. xxi-xxx; Select Bills in Eyre
(S.. S.); Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, Essays i~s
Legal History, 1913, 261-285; Pollock, The Transformation of Equity,
ibid., 286-296; Powicke's Review of the Select Bills in Eyre, 3o ENG.
HisT. REv. 330-336; G. B. Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16
COLUMBIA LAW REV. 87.
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equitable considerations and doctrines associated, in modem
times, with the equitable jurisdiction of the chancellor. That
cases in which these equitable considerations and equitable doc-
trines occur are more numerous than was at one time supposed
is now a well ascertained fact. They raise the important ques-
tion whether the equity which the common law judges admin-
istered in these cases can be regarded as the beginnings of the
system of equity developed by the chancellor; or whether these
early equitable doctrines so completely died out that we must
regard the chancellor's equity as a new and a different develop-
ment.
Distinguished' authorities have maintained that some, at least,
of the manifestations of these early equitable doctrines are so
substantially similar to the equity of the chancellor, that they
may be said to have had a continuous history. Mr. Bolland,
speaking of the bills in Eyre, says, "I think there can be no
doubt that these bills are the very beginning of the equitable
jurisdiction.12  Dr. Hazeltine says that the Chancery "did not
originate English Equity, for it simply carried on the work of
the older courts by developing in greater fulness and with a
different machinery the equity inherent in royal justice."3  It
is the purpose of this paper to try and ascertain whether this
early equity, administered by the common law judges, is so closely
connected with the equity administered by the chancellor, that
these two periods in the history of equity can in any sense be
said to be continuous.
Any question of historical continuity is always very debate-
able. What amount of resemblance will justify us in asserting
that there is no breach of continuity? What amount of differ-
ence will justify us in asserting that there is a breach of con-
tinuity? These are questions which different persons will answer
in different ways. But clearly we cannot answer them by looking
at any one feature of the institutions or doctrines which we are
considering. We must look at them from all the most important
points of view. And therefore in considering this question of
the-continuity of these two phases of English Equity I propose
to look at them from four points of view :--The point of view of
the tribunals by which they were administered'; of the pro-
cedure which those tribunals employed; of the theories upon
2 The Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxviii, xxix.
3 Essays in Legal History, 285.
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which the equitable rules were based; and of certain of the
equitable doctrines to which they gave rise.
TRIBUNALS
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the undiffer-
entiated Curia Regis of the twelfth century was marked by
two of the chief characteristics which we associate with a court
of equity. Proceedings were begun by a petition to the king for
his interference ;4 and that interference might result in remedies
which, by reason both of their character and their methods of
enforcement, were, as Professor Adams has said, "as much out-
side of, and in violation of, the ordinary system of justice which
prevailed throughout the Anglo-Norman state, as ever Equity
was at any later time in relation to the Common Law system." 5
But, in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
these remedies, the rules to which they gave rise, and the machin-
ery b" which they were enforced, rapidly developed and hardened
into a regular system, of law. As that system reduced the
remedies and rules and machinery of the older courts to insignifi-
cance, the rules of the -Curia Regis became the ordinary common
law of the country, and ceased to possess that characteristic
of being something outside the ordinary law, which had once
given to them an equitable character. At the same time the
other equitable characteristic which it had once possessed-the
immediate dependence of its remedies upon the royal power-
weakened. In the first place it acquired a number of writs de
cursu which any litigant could purchase. In the second place
the barons, and later the Parliament, perceiving that the power
to make new writs was in substance a power to make new law,
limited the king's discretion to invent new remedies.0 Thus the
system of the common law tended to be.come rigid and technical;
and this tendency was strengthened when, at the close of the
thirteenth century, its development began to be controlled almost
entirely by men who had been trained as practitioners in the
royal courts. 7 But, naturally, the equitable characteristics which
had marked the jurisdiction of the 'Curia Regis did not at once
vanish from those separate courts which had sprung from it.
4 G. B. Adams, I6 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 89-9o.
5 Ibid., 93.
0 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 247-8
7 lbid., 182, 267.
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We can see traces of them, certainly as late as the first quarter
of the fourteenth century, both in the three common law courts,
and in the courts held by the itinerant justices.
In the days of Bracton the court of King's Bench and the
King's Council were to a large extent staffed by the same men.
8
The two institutions which became in later days the court of
King's Bench and the Council were not as yet distinct; and, even
when they became distinct, the connection between the two was
close. Cases occur as late as Edward III's reign in which the
proceedings seem to be heard by a tribunal which is both court
and council.9  Naturally this tended to preserve the tradition
that the court of King's Bench ought to administer both law and
equity; and the fact that the tradition was thus preserved in
the court of King's Bench helped to preserve it also in the court
of Common Pleas. The King's Bench was the court in which
the errors of the 'Common Pleas were corrected; both courts
were staffed by men who had had a similar training; and
judges were sometimes moved from one bench to the other."0
In fact, as I have elsewhere pointed out"" and as I shall show
later in this paper, 12 both the court of Common Pleas and the
court of King's Bench did apply to cases which came before
them ideas and doctrines which we have come to associate with
equity rather than with law. But early in the fourteenth cen-
tury these cases were becoming rare. As Professor Baldwin
has pointed out, quite early in the thirteenth century the King's
Bench was tending to hear cases in accordance with "the for-
mulaic procedure" of the common law.1 3 That tendency was
more pronounced in the case of the court of Common Pleas.
The King's Bench continued in some cases to employ "the
free and unrestricted procedure of the old Curia Regis."'1 4 But,
by the middle of the fourteenth century, in both courts, the com-
mon law procedure was generally followed ;15 and, as that pro-
8 Baldwin, The King's Council, 61-2.
9 Baldwin, The King's Council, 64; cp. Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law,
I., 82-3.
10 See Foss's Tables of the judges of the courts of King's Bench and
Common Pleas, Lives of the Judges, IMI., 25-26, 201-2, 353-5.
" Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 249, 250.
12 Below.




cedure had now hardened into a very technical system, this is
a sure sign that the capacity of these courts to administer equity
had disappeared.
The Court of Exchequer was a court of a character differ-
ent from that of the King's Bench and Common Pleas. 16  Its
connection with the Council was intimate; and, in the thirteenth
and early part of the fourteenth century, cases which demanded
the application of equitable principles frequently came before
it.17  But, as Professor Baldwin has shown, in Edward II's
reign the chancellor got the better of the treasurer, and the
Chancery and Council took the jurisdiction over these cases away
from the Exchequer.'8 It was not till later that the Exchequer
began to develop both the common law and the equitable juris-
diction which it subsequently obtained.' 9  Throughout the
mediaeval period it concerned itself mainly with its proper func-
tion-the consideration of cases connected with the king's
revenue.
That the justices in Eyre administered a large equitable juris-
diction in proceedings begun by bill has been recently discovered
by Mr. Bolland. Of these bills I shall speak at large in my
next section. Here it will be sufficient to say that they are, so
far as we know, peculiar to the General Eyre.20  The reason for
this is perhaps to be found partly in the fact that the justices in
Eyre represented the person, and were commissioned to exer-
cise the powers, of the king in an eminent degree; 2 1 partly in
IG Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Lav.,, I., 100-104.
37Baldwin, The King's Council, 219-228.
18 Ibid., 228-231.
19 Ibid., 232; on the common law side this is illustrated by the numbers
of cases on the rolls of the court of Exchequer as compared with the
number of cases on the rolls of the two Benches, see 18 LAW QuA\RT. REV.
134.
20 The Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxiii-Mr. Bolland says, "The vague-
ness of the address and the frequent absence of any date make it impos-
sible to say with any certainty that all these bills were presented in Eyre,
though when we get any trustworthy indication of time in connection
with venue it usually seems to point to such a presentation."
21 Mr. Boland in the Eyre of Kent (S. S.), III., xlvi, accepted the dic-
tum of Shareshull, C. J., in 27 Ass. pl. i, that the King's Bench is Eyre
and higher than the Eyre; but in Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xv-xix, he
contends that this view is erroneous; Professor Powicke, 3o ENG. HIST.
REV., 334-5, has given good reasons for preferring Mr. Bollands' former
view; but, having regard to the wide jurisdiction of the Eyre. it
would probably be 1true to say that it was a court almost as high as
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the fact that their court gave to dwellers in the country a unique
opportunity to appeal to those powers of administering equity
which the king still possessed. 22  This would explain why bills,
like the bills in Eyre, were not presented to the King's Bench
or Com -mon Pleas. Litigants who approached the courts at
Westminster with cases of this kind would be more likely to
petition the 'Council. However that may be, they are a striking
and a late example of the equity which the Curia Regis and the
King's Bench in its early days were accustomed to administer.
But in the course of the fourteenth century the General Eyre
ceased. 23  Its place was taken by itinerant judges who acted
under limited commissions, and tried cases according to the
strict procedure of the common law.
24
Thus all these common law tribunals ceased to administer
equity. Cases which called for equity went to the Council, and
later to the .Chancery.25 Thus the administration of equity was
handed over to a tribunal which, in time, came to be perfectly
distinct from any of the common law. courts. And this is per-
haps the most unique feature of English as contrasted with
Roman equity. The Roman prwetor urbanws administered both
law and equity; and therefore it was easier to fuse the two sys-
tems: the chancellor and the cormmon law judges were distinct
and often rival authorities. Thus Justinian could effect what
the English Judicature Acts could not effect. He fused law
and equity: they, for the most part, only fused the courts which
administered law and equity.
It would seem therefore that there is no continuity in the
equitable jurisdiction of the common law courts. They ceased
the King's Bench; this would seem to be borne out by the extract from
Britton, I., ig-2o, cited by Mr. Bolland, Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.),
xviii-"And meantime we will command our Justices of the Bench that
they adjourn all the pleas of the county and send them before us or such
Justices itinerant in that county, so that they be there at the day named."
22 Mr. Bolland says, Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxiii, "All these bills
appear to be country bills, and I feel no doubt that if any of them were
not presented in Eyre-in a General Eyre, to be quite accurate-they
were at any rate presented in those less comprehensive Eyres of Justices
erranz' commissioned to hold common pleas, to whom the King gave
also authority 'to hear . . . any complaints whatsoever and to make
fitting amends therefore.'"2
8 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, I., 1,5-6.
24Ibid., I., 116-123.
25 Ibid., I., i99.
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to administer it; and litigants, if they wanted equity, were driven
to a tribunal the procedure of which had remained free from
the technical rules which governed procedure of the common
law courts .2  The question now arises whether the equity there
administered was so substantially similar to the equity formerly
administered in the common law courts that we can regard
it as a continuation, or whether it was so essentially different
that we must regard it as a new departure. This question
I shall endeavor to answer in the following sections.
PROCEDURE
In modern law a salient difference between the procedure in
an action at law and the procedure in a suit in equity consisted
in the fact that, in an action at law, the proceedings were begun
by writ, and were based upon a legal right which the plaintiff
asserted had been infringed; while, in a suit in equity, the pro-
ceedings were begun by bill, and were based upon facts which
made it just and equitable that the plaintiff should get the
remedy or relief which he sought. Therefore, when it was dis-
covered that, at the General Eyre, there was a procedure accord-
ing to which aggrieved persons could begin legal proceedings
by bill; that in these bills suitors applied to the court for relief
on general grounds of justice and equity; and that they used lan-
guage which was in many cases identical with that used in the
early bills in 'Chancery,--it was not unnaturally thought that
the origin of the -Chancery procedure must be looked for in
these bills in Eyre. In considering the question whether this
view is correct I shall in the first place describe the general
characteristics of these bills. Secondly, I shall say something
of the term "bill" and the various sorts of "bill" known to
English law; and I shall endeavour to ascertain which of these
categories of bills, the bills in Eyre most resemble. Thirdly, I
shall point out some salient differences between the procedure
upon these bills in Eyre and 'the procedure upon the bill in
Chancery.
26 "In distinction from the bench of the curia regis which became the
king's bench, the council was not swept into the current of the common
law. True to the traditions of the older court coram rege and the
original curia, it remained a body of indefinite powers and unrestricted
procedure," Baldwin, The King's Council, 64.
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(i) The Characteristics of the Bills in Eyre
These bills are found chiefly in the Eyre of Shropshire of
1292, the Eyre of Staffordshire of 1293, the Eyre of Kent of
1313-14, and the Eyre of Derbyshire of 1331.27 They pre-
sent a striking similarity both in form and in substance to some
of the early bills addressed to the chancellor, or to the chancellor
and Council. The suppliants are not tied down to the strict
rules of form which governed the wording of the writ.28  They
are phrased in simple and often in illiterate language. 29  Some,
perhaps, were written by a professional letter writer. 0  Others,
when written more than ordinarily badly, were copied literally
by some clerk.31 They were largely but not exclusively used by
poor people ;32 and, like the later bills addressed to the chancellor,
they pray a remedy "for God's sake," "for charity's sake,"
"for the love of Jesus Christ," "for the Queen's soul's sake." 33
They are generally addressed "A les Justices nostre Seygnur
le Roy";34 and they ask for a remedy-generally damages,
sometimes an injunction or other order-on equitable grounds. 5
And the wrongs for which these remedies are sought are of
the most varied character. Mr. Bolland says :6 "We see that
no misfeasance or non-feasance was too slight or too grave to
be the subject of a complaint by a bill in Eyre. The recovery
of debts, large and small, and the enforcement of contracts were
sought for by them. Damages were claimed by them for
detinue, breach of contract, trespass, negligence, illegal distress,
wrongful imprisonment, for abduction of ward, for conspiracy
to deceive the court and pervert the course of justice, and for
almost every other tortious act or omission by which a man
might be endamaged. . . . They tell of crimes of violence
for which up to comparatively recent times a man . . . would
certainly have been hanged." Some of the stories they relate
are wonderful. One, which tells of a gallant who broke into
27 Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xxxiv.
28 Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxvi.
29 Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xix.
30 Ibid., xix.
31 Ibid., xix, xx.
32 Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxv, xxvi.
33Ibid., xxv.
84 Ibid., xxii.
35 Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xl; see e. g. cases IO, 33, 64.
386Ibid., xl.
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a house through a cellar wall, and eloped with the faithless wife
and part of the husband's property,8 7 reads, as Mr. Bolland says,
"like the synopsis of a story in some such collection as Les Cent
Nouvelles Nouvelles."3 s
It is hardly surprising that, in the first excitement of discov-
ery, these bills should be regarded as the direct ancestors of
the early bills sent up to the chancellor. But, before the valid-
ity of this pedigree can be admitted, we must look at these
bills, and the proceedings taken thereon, a little more closely.
(ii) The Term "Bill" and the Various Sorts of "Bill" Known
to English Law
Mr. Bolland is probably right in his suggestion that the word
"bill" is derived, not as it is said in the Oxford English Dic-
tionary from bulla, but from libellus, through the French libelle.
The word libelle, like the old English word "book," meant in its
original sense a charter or sheet of parchment with writing on it.
It then acquired, from its use in the law of procedure, the tech-
nical sense of a complaint or statement of claim. Probably
"bill" is a clipped form of libelle, and was used to signify a
complaint.30  But it never acquired in English law quite the
precise technical meaning that it acquired in Roman law. It
seems rather to have been used as a generic term for many forms
of complaint or petition which were not begun by original writ.
Thus it was, and still is, the name for a written information
as to the commission of a crime which, when found to be true
by the grand jury, will .becom1e an indictment.
40 It was used
to signify a complaint against the king, which could not be prose-
37 Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), case 49.
88 Ibid., xxiii.
39 Select Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xi-xv; Powicke, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 334.
40 Stephen, History of Criminal Law, I., 274; and this procedure was
as old as the reign of Edward I; Solomon of Rochester, one of the
judges accused before Edward I's commissioners "dicit quod in itinere
justiciariorum talis est consuetudo pro pace observanda, quod quicumque
de populo huiusmodi billam obtulerit cuicumque justiciario majori vel
minori, idem justiciarius illam billam debet recipere et tradere eam duo-
denis juratoribus ad capitula corone, ita quod, si verum sit quot in ea
continetur, ipsi presentant illud in veredicto suo, et si non sit verum
quod deniant billam istam," State Trials of the Reign of Edward I
(Camden Society) 3d series, 69, cited Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxii, n. 2.
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cuted by writ because no writ lay against the king.41  The
complaints against Edward I's judges were made by bills. 42
Actions by and against officials of the three common law courts,
and the court of -Chancery were begun by bill in the court to which
they were attached ;43 there was an old procedure by bill, long
disused in Hale's time, for contempts, deceits, trespasses, and other
niatters which might originally have been begun by writ in the
King's Bench ;44 and there was the well known procedure by bill
of Middlesex dgainst a person in custodia Marescalli.4' Then
we have the bills sent up by the House of 'Commons to the king,
which, by an important change in Parliamentary procedure in the
fifteenth century, became the "Billae formam actus in se conti-
nentes," and the "Bills entituled Acts," of our modem law.
48
Finally we have the bills sent up to the Council and chancellor,
or to the chancellor, which came to be the method of initiating
proceedings in the court of Chancery.
41 "In old times every writ, whether of right or of the possession,
lay well against the king, and nothing is now changed except that one
must now sue against him by bill where formerly one sued by writ,"
Year Books, 33-35 Edward I (Rolls Series), 471, per Passeley arg.
42 The Eyre of Kent (S. C.), II., xxi.
43 Hale, A Discourse concerning the courts of King's Bench and Com-
mon Pleas, Harg. Law Tracts, 364-5.
44 "These suits were for the most part for contempts, deceits, and
trespasses upon the case, whether the same were committed in the same
county where the court sat, or in other counties. And the course was,
(i) For the party to enter his plaint or bill, (2) thereupon he had the
like process as was natural in such suit, had it been thereby original;"
Hale then gives some instances of these bills for trespass and other
matters from Edward III's reign, and remarks that, in those days, if
the party did not proceed by original writ he proceeded by original bill,
and not by bill of Middlesex--"which seems not to be so ancient a
practice"; Hale then notes the following points in connection with these
bills.-(i) The bill was filed before process was made. (2) The process
was pursuant to the course of law. (3) The process was special accord-
ing to the nature of the bill as if the suit had been by original writ.
(4) "This bill lay not for any such cause, wherein the original writ lay
not in the king's bench; and therefore was not in debt, detinue, account,
or covenant." (5) They were not frequent. (6) They have been long
disused, partly because they diminished the king's revenues derived
from writs, partly because the procedure by way of bill of Middlesex
was more expeditious, Harg. Law Tracts, 363, 364.
4 5 Ibid., 365-6; Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, I., 87-89.
46 Redlich, Procedure of the House of Commons, I., 16, 17; Anson,
The Parliament, 249-251; Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 363-366.
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The question now arises, To which of these categories of
bills do the bills in Eyre bear the most resemblance? Professor
Powicke has suggested that these bills were necessitated by the
breakdown of the criminal appeal.4 7  The cases collected by Mr.
Bolland prove, as he says, "the necessity of methods of accusa-
tion open to individuals.148  I have elsewhere pointed out that,
if justice is to be done, the law must provide some procedure
which will enable the injured person to come forward andobtain
a remedy for himself; and that, in consequence, the present-
ment by the country side and the subsequent indictment at the
king's suit need to be supplemented by the action of the injured
person.4 9  I have suggested also that the breakdown of the
criminal appeal left a large gap which was ultimately filled by
the writ of trespass and its offshoots.50 Now, at the period when
these bills appear, the writ of trespass was as yet new, and the
development of its offshoots had hardly begun. It may be that
these bills helped to fill the gap left by the decay of the appeal,
and not yet filled by the writ of trespass. And, in this connec-
tion, we may naturally think of that procedure by bill in the
King's Bench mentioned by Hale, which had been long disused
in his dayY' These bills, he tells us, were brought "for the most
part for contempts, deceits, and trespasses upon the case." 2  If
this procedure was a survival from a procedure by bill which
in any way resembled the bills in Eyre, it would naturally tend
47.3o ENG. HIST. REv. 333; for the criminal appeal and its decay see
Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 201, 305-307.
48 "If the cases edited by Mr. Bolland prove anything, they prove the
necessity of methods of accusation open to individuals. They show that
the grave charges brought against the juries of presentment in the
Statute of Winchester were more than justified; to read them one would
think that the tithing, the hue and cry, and the sworn knights of the
hundred, had never existed. A simple form of the appeal was essen-
tial during the interval betwcen the breakdown of the system of cor-
porate responsibility and the reorganisation of criminal jurisdiction
through the justices of the peac," Powicke, 3o ENG. HIsT. REV. 333.
41 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 305.
50 Ibid., II., 305, 377.
5 1 Above, note 44.
52 Ibid., it will be noticed that Hale says that these bills could not be
brought on any cause "Wherein an original writ lay not in the king's
bench, and therefore not in debt, detinue, account or covenant"; on the
other hand these bills in Eyre did lie in these cases; but this is not sur-
prising as the jurisdiction of the Eyre covered both these causes of
action and causes of action which belonged to the King's Bench.
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to fall into disuse when writs of trespass became common, and
numerous writs of trespass on case began to develop. More-
over the procedure by bill of Middlesex was, as Hale notes, found
to be more expeditious.
3
At any rate we shall now see that the procedure on these bills
in Eyre, in one most important respect resembled these billi in
the King's Bench, and differed from the bills by which a suit in
equity was begun before the chancellor.
(iii) The Procedure on the Bills in Eyre and the Procedure
on Bills in Chancery
A plaintiff who sued by bill was not liable to fail for defects
in the form of the bill, provided the bill told an intelligible and
consistent story.'4  In fact the judge would occasionally ques-
tion a plaintiff in order to bring out the essential cause of com-
plaint.5  But it would seem that, when the bill was before the
court, "the subsequent proceedings under it were exactly the
same as though action had been taken by writ."' 6  The endorse-
ments on the bill seem to show, Mr. Bolland says, that the
process was the same ;17 and what indications we have, seem to
point to the conclusion that the course of pleading upon them in
court was also the same. 8 Here again we may remember that
Hale tells us that, under the bill procedure in the King's Bench,
the bill must be filed before process is made, and that the
subsequent course of the process was the same as if the action
had been begun by writ. 9  Now -all this is entirely different
from the subsequent procedure upon a bill brought before the
chancellor.
In the fifteenth century the course which the procedure upon
a bill brought before the chancellor took was somewhat as
follows :-The bill usually prayed that a subpoena90 should be
issued to secure the appearance and examination of the defend-
53 Ibid.
54 The Eyre of Kent (S. S.), II., xxvi, xxvii.
" Ibid., II., xxvi.
56 Bills in Eyre (S. S.), xxii.
57 Ibid.
58 See, e. g., Bills in Eyre (S. S.), App. A., pp. 152-155, where further
proceedings on several bills are given from Hale, MSS. 137, (2) and 44.
59Above, note 44.
60 Sometimes the prayer was for a writ of certiorari or habeas corpus.
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ant. At the foot of the bill were the names of the pledges to
prosecute. In this they resemble some of the bills in Eyre; ° '
but it should be observed that, in the case of the bills in Chan-
cery, these pledges were rendered necessary by the fact that a
statute of Henry VI's reign had prohibited the issue of a writ
of subpoena till the plaintiff had found sureties to satisfy the
defendant's damages if he did not prove his case.62 When the
defendant appeared, both the plaintiff and his witnesses, and
the defendant and any witnesses which he might produce, were
examined by the chancellor or by some other person deputed by
him."' The methods which the chancellor used to elicit the truth
by the examination and the re-examination of witnesses, and by
compelling the production of documents were very effective.
Professor Barbour has explained this very clearly. He says :64
"The examination was under oath; it is sometimes said to be
on the sacrament, sometimes 'on a boke.' If the defendants
lived at some distance from London, or were ill and unable to
appear, a commission by writ of Dedimus Potestatem would be
granted to take the defendant's answer and also to examine
witnesses. A certificate of the answer and testimony would
then be taken into chancery. . . . Evidence verbal or written
was placed on the same footing, but the Chancellor compelled a
petitioner to prove his case. If he deemed the evidence insuffi-
cient or conflicting, he would call for more, and no decree could
be had until it was produced."
No doubt in many cases the facts elicited were decisive; and
this, as Spence suggests,6  may account for there being so many
bills without and further proceedings thereon. But often there
were further proceedings. The defendant might answer the
bill, 6 or demur to it,67 or plead specially, e. g., that the proper
81 Bills in Ejre (S. S.), passim.
02 15 Henry VI, c. 4; Barbour, The History of Contract in Early Eng-
lish Equity, Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, IV., 145;
these pledges to prosecute soon became as fictitious in Chancery as
they were in the common law courts; Martin, Archaeologia (2d series),
Vol. X., pt. ii, 353-5; at p. 355 he mentions a case in which the second
pledge's name is simply the first pledge's name spelt backwards.
63 Barbour, op. cit., 149.
6, Barbour, op..cit., 149.
65 Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction, I., 372.
66 Ibid., I., 373
6TIbid.
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parties had not been joined.6 1 Naturally the common lawyers
tried to introduce their technical rules of pleading."9 We get
replications and rejoinders not unlike those used in the common
law courts. But the chancellors set their faces against attempts
to defeat plaintiffs by objections based upon the technical com-
mon law rules of pleadings ;70 and they always maintained that
in their court litigants were not to be prejudiced by mispleading
or defects of form, and that they were to be judged according to
the truth of their cases.71
Now it is quite clear that we have here a procedure very differ-
ent from the procedure on the bills in Eyre. The only resem-
blance is in fact that the proceedings are begun by a bill. The
most salient feature of the chancery procedure-the examina-
tion of the parties and their witnesses-is absent. I conclude,
therefore, that the differences between the procedure on the
bills in Eyre and the procedure on the bills in Chancery are so
marked that it can hardly be supposed that the one was derived
from the other. Professor Adams is quite correct when he says
that '"the ancestor of the bill in Equity is to be found, not in
the bills in Eyre, but in the petitions to the Council.
'72
As we shall now see, the fact that the most salient feature of
the chancery procedure was the examination of the parties, and
their witnesses, points to a very fundamental difference between
the theories upon Which the equity of the common law courts and
the equity of the chancellors were based.
THEORIES UPON WHICH EQUITABLE INTERFERENCE WAS BASED
The equity administered through the cornion law courts was
administered on the broad basis that justice must so far as
possible be done to parties who had a good ground of com-
plaint. The equity administered by the chancellor, on the other
hand, rested on the more restricted idea of the canon lawyers,
68 Y. B. 8 Ed. IV, Trin. pl. I, cited ibid., n. h.
69 Spence, op. cit., 375.
70 y. B. 9 Ed. IV, Trin. pl. 9; cp. Y. B. 9 Ed. IV, Mich. pl. 26.
71 Y. B. 9 Ed. IV, Trin. pl. 9.
72 I6 'CoLuMBIA LAw REv. 98; and Professor Powicke is inclined
to agree; he says, "Sir Frederick Pollock has noticed the similarity
between the bill in eyre and the bill in chancery; yet I venture to think
that it would be erroneous, on the strength of this similarity, to suggest
that the bill in chancery developed from the bill in eyre," 3o ENG. HIsT.
REV. 332.
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that the court ought to compel each individual litigant to fulfill
the duties dictated by reason and conscience. It followed that
the examination of the litigant was absolutely essential to the
administration of equity. Obviously, the judge could not ascer-
tain what course of action conscience would dictate in any given
case unless by this examination he elicited all the facts. Thus
the theory on which the chancellor's equitable interference was
based differed from the theory upon which the equity adminis-
tered by the common law was based. Further we must remem-
ber that the whole system of the equity of the chancellor was,
to a large extent, governed by the existence of the rival system
of the common law. That system the chancellors followed
critically-supplementing it and correcting it. This introduces
another element into the equity of the chancellor which was
necessarily wholly absent from the equity administered by the
common law courts. We shall now see that these differences
were the cause of considerable differences between the equitable
doctrines which were evolved in these two jurisdictions.
EQUITABLE DOCTRINES
The two equitable doctrines which I have selected for pur-
poses of illustration are the rules as to the grant of Specific
Relief and as to Uses.
Specific Relief
In the time of Bracton the common law courts gave specific
relief in a large number of cases. Generally this relief was
incidental to and based upon the specific relief which was the
characteristic feature of the real actions. These actions cov-
ered a very wide field. They could be used, not only to enforce
a plaintiff's right to the possession of a freehold interest in land,
but also to enforce the obligations of the lords and tenants
73 Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurispru-
dence, 24 LAW QUART. REv. 379, says: "In the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, in the period of the early predominance of the common law,
equity, though specifically recognised, and sometimes applied in practice,
was taken in a wider sense, including justices and analogy ;" on the other
hand, it is clear from St. Germain's Doctor and Student that the eccle-
siastical chancellors were governed by a different principl-"St. Germain
formulates distinctly the proposition that equity excepts from the law
on grounds supplied by reason and conscience, and it is on the strength
of conscience that remedies in equity were commonly granted."
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of land.74 We accordingly find that specific relief could be got
(a) in actions to enforce obligations connected with property
and contracts; and (b) to prevent various kinds of wrongs to
property.
(a) If a landlord broke his covenant to lease land for a term
of years, the court restored possession to the lessee ;75 and simi-
lar relief could be got by the writ Quare ejecit infra terminum.7
Many various arrangements relating to land could be made by
fine; and specific relief could be got if the parties did not keep
their bargains. In one case the sheriff was not only ordered to
deliver seisin in accordance with the terms of a fine, but also
to demolish a ditch which had been erected in a place where
there was a right of common." In another case the party in
default was ordered to fulfill his duty of warranty,78 and in
another he was forbidden to demand forinsec service. 79  The
duty of a donor to warrant the title of his donee, ° of a lord
to perform the services due to his superior lord so that his
tenant was not distrained by that superior lord,"' of a lord to
take the homage of a tenant, 2 of a tenant to repair,'8 are all
specifically enforced. These duties were enforced sometimes by
distraint,8 4 sometimes by taking security, 5 and sometimes by for-
feiture of the land.88
74 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Lau-, III., 1-19.
75 Ibid., III., i8o; cf. Bracton's Note Book, case 1739.
7s Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, III., 181.
77 Bracton's Note Book, case x579, "Et ideo consideratum est ....
quia cognoscit finem, habeat Abbas breve ad vicecomitem quod secundum
proportum cyrographi habere faciat eidem Abbati communam illam, et si
fossatum levaverit infra communam illam, illud prosterni faciat ita quod
pastura illa sit in eodem statu quo fuit quando concordia facta fuit inter
eos"; cf. case 1386-an order to demolish two houses erected on land
where there was a right of common.
78 Ibid., case 1652.
79 Ibid., case 361.
80 Ibid., case 594.
81 Ibid., case 390.
82 Ibid., case 838.
83 Ibid., case 1165.
84 Ibid., case io81.
85 Ibid., cases 1075, 1165.
8 BIbid., case 540, "Dictum est ei quod de cetero sub pena amissionis
predictae terrae non faciat vastam vel destruccionem;" see generally
Hazeltine, op. cit., 269.
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(b) The prevention of various kinds of wrongs to prop-
erty.
It was only natural that the courts should make similar orders
if a defendant was proved to have been guilty of specifically
wrongful acts, such as nuisance or waste. Thus in one case a
market,8 7 and in another case a ditch,88 was ordered to be sup-
pressed because it was a nuisance. A guardian was ordered to
replace two houses which had been removed, and to find pledges
that he would both replace these houses and that he would
commit no further waste.89 But in the case of waste the court
possessed another weapon in the writ of prohibition, which at
this period, was so developed that it did work analogous to that
done both by the perpetual and the interlocutory injunction of
our modem law. Thus the dowress,19 the guardian,9 2 and the
lessee for life9 s or years,9 could be prohibited from committing
waste; and if, as in the case of the dowress, the commission
of waste did not entail the forfeiture of the property, the heir
could be given the power to appoint a person to see that no
further waste was committed.9 5 Further the writ of estrepment
could be brought to prevent the commission of waste after judg-
ment in a real action;981 and, as extended by the statute of
Gloucester, to prevent its commission pending the proceedings
in such an action.9 7  No doubt these writs of prohibition were as
87 Bracton's Note Book, case 1162, "Consideratum est quod mercatum
de Melefordia prosternatur et Abbas in misericordia."
8sIbid., case 1253.
89 Bracton's Note Book, case 1o75, "Et ideo pro parvitate vasti et modo
vastandi consideratum est quod Godefridus faciat alias duas domos ad
valenciam predictarum domorum et sit in misericordia. Et invenit tales
plegios quod amplias non faciat vastum nec arbores asportabit et quod
faciat domos sicut predictum est."
90 Hazeltine, op. cit., 270-284.
91 Bracton's Note Book, cases 461, 527, 540; Bracton, ff. 315, 316.
92 Bracton's Note Book, cases 388, 443, IO75, iI65.
93 Ibid, case 607.
94 Ibid., case 54o.
95 Bracton's Note Book, case 56, "Consideratum est quod Albertus
habeat forestarium suum et ipsi Hamon et Matillis nichil capiant nisi
per visum forestarii ipsius Alberti scilicet, haibote et usbote, et sint in
misericordia quia contra prohibicionem etc vastum inde fecerunt"; cf.
Hazeltine, op. cit., 272.
96 Hazeltine, Op. cit., 275.
97 6 Edward I, c. 13.
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often as not addressed to the sheriff, because he was the execu-
tive officer of the court.98 But they could also be addressed to
the parties, and, in such cases, it is clear that they present an
analogy to the equitable injunction.99
In the Year Books of Edward I and II's reigns there are
instances of specific relief given in cases which fell within the
sphere of the real actions. Thus it is said in Y. B. 30, 31
Edward ,100 "if a man ought to have house-bote and hay-bote
in another's wood, and he to whom the wood belongs wishes
to destroy the wood, the other can bring a Prohibition, and after
that an attachment." Similarly in Y. B. 2, 3 Edward II the
owner of a market got what was, in substance, an injunction
to prevent persons from selling their goods otherwise than in
the market on the days on which the market was held.' 0 ' More-
over in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
developments had taken place in some of the real actions which
enabled them. to be used to remedy not only a completed wrong,
but also to prevent an anticipated wrong. 0 2
98 Hazeltine, op. ci., 283.
0OBracton's Note Book affords many instances of both varieties; cp.
F. N. B. 6o V, "When a man hath a real action depending, as a Forine-
don, or a Dum fuit infra aetatem or a writ of right, or such action wherein
the demandant shall not recover damages; then he may sue this writ
of Estrepment against the tenant, inhibiting him that he do not make
waste or strip"; ibid., 6i A, "And in every real action the demandant
may have a writ unto the sheriff, commanding him that he see that the
statute which ordaineth the estrepment be observed; and that he do not
suffer the tenant to do such strip: and by the like reas6n he may have
the writ against the tenant."
i00 y. B. 30, 31, Ed. I (R. S.), 324.
'01 Y. B. 2, 3, Ed. II (S. S.), 74--"Et ideo consideratum est quod pre-
dictus Prior recuperet versus eos dampna sua predicta, et quod predicti
Willelmus et alii decetero mercimonia sua venalia per dies Veneris, quibus
idem Prior habet mercatum suum predictum, alibi in predicta villa de
Coventre quam in predicto mercato suo non vendant seu vendicioni
exponant."
102 Coke says, Co. Lift., iooa, "And note that there be six writs in law
that may be maintained quia timet, before any molestation, distress or
impleading. (i) A man may have his writ of mesne (whereof Littleton
here speaks) before he be distrained, (2) A warrantia cartae, before he
be impleaded. (3) A Monstraverunt before any distress or vexation.
(4) An Audita Querela, before any execution sued. (5) A curia clau-
denda, before any default of inclosure. (6) A ne injuste vexes, before
any distress or molestation. And these be called Brevia anticipantia,
writs of prevention"; Coke cites no authority for this, and it is
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It is clear that in all these cases the specific relief given cen-
tered round the real actions. It was therefore bound up with
and conditioned by the technical rules of the most technical
part of the common law. Even in the Middle Ages cases had
arisen which showed that, even as between persons entitled to
land, the principles upon which the common law acted were too
narrowv. 03 Now, if we turn to the principles upon which the
chancellor gave this specific relief, we shall see that they were
quite different from and much wider than those of the com-
mon law. He granted it whenever in the circumstances he
thought that it was fair that it should be granted. It is not sur-
prising that equitable relief given on this principle should, from
an early date, have supplemented the relief given by the common
law courts; and that, finally, when the specific relief given by
the common law declined in importance with the decline of the
real actions, it should have superseded it.
The width of the principle upon which the chancellor gave
specific relief led litigants in early days to apply to him in
probable from the form of these writs that their use quia timet was a
comparatively late development; thus Litt., § IWi, clearly supposes that
the tenant must have been distrained before Mesne lay; and this was
the original form of the writ, F. N. B. 135 M. The earliest case cited
by Fitzherbert in which the writ was brought before distraint is of
Henry IV's reign, Bro. Ab. Mesne, citing a MS. Y. B. of 7 Hy. IV;
in Y. B. 22 Hy. VI, Mich. pl. 39 (p. 23), it appears that the question how
far warrantia cartae lay quia timet was by no means clear; Fitzherbert,
N. B., says nothing of the use of the writ of Monstraverunt quia timet;
the form of the writ Audita Querela supposes execution, F. N. B. io3 H.,
and he says nothing of its use quia timet; the first case cited by
F. N. B. for the proposition that Curia Claudenda lies quia timet is
27 Hy. VI.; the form of the writ ne injuste vexes would seem to permit
of its use quia timet, but the count given by F. N. B. io H. supposes the
completed wrong. I think therefore that the use of these writs quia
timet was due to developments of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries;
similarly the writ of Estrepment was extended to all actions in which
damages were recoverable, cf. Y. B. I4 Hy. VII, Mich. pl. i7, with
F. N. B. 6o Y.; an attempt to extend this writ still further was suppressed
by Lord Egerton in 1594, Hazeltine, Legal Essays, 277.
10 "Per Egerton custodem magni sigilli, que il ad view un president
en temps de R. 2 que l'ou la est tenant pur vie le remainder pur vie, le
remainder ouster in fee, per que le wast en le primer tenant pur vie
est dispunishable per le common ley: uncore ad estre decree en
Chancery per l'advice des Judges sur complaint de cestuy en remainder
en fee, que le primer tenant ne faira wast, et injunction la grant,"
(I599) Moore, K. B., 554, pl. 748.
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cases which, being outside the sphere of the real actions, no
specific relief could be given at common law. We get bills for
the delivery up of specific chattels against not only the persons
who had taken or otherwise possessed themselves of them,'"4 or
to whom they had been bailed,10 5 but also against third persons
into whose hands they had come. 0 6 We get bills for the per-
formance of specific acts;'0 7 for the specific performance of
contracts, 08 injunctions against wrongs. 109  No doubt, when
litigants began to apply to the chancellor for specific relief in
cases in which similar relief might have been got in a real
action, equity followed -the law. It may even have borrowed
some of its ideas and rules from it." 0  It was obviously fair
that similar relief should be given. But the principle upon which
it acted was different and wider. It is these wider principles,
and not the principles applied by the common law courts in con-
nection with the real actions which govern our modern law. I
think therefore that, though there are many analogies between
the two sets of principles, there is no real continuity."'
Uses
On this point I can fortunately be brief, as the point which
I wish to make has already been made by Ames." 2  Though there
104 Select Cases in Chancery (S. S.), 82, IOO-I1, 113-4; Proceedings
in Chancery (Rec. Com.), II., vii; Barbour, op. cit., 174.
105 Barbour, op. cit., 112.
106Ibid., 114 n. 4; cp. Earl of Shrewsbury v. Coland, Proceedings in
Chancery (Rec. Com.), I., xl.
1o Barbour, op. cit., 87-8--cancellation of documents; Select Cases in
Chancery (S. S.), 130-1, a suit for partition.
108 Select Cases in Chancery (S. S.), 43-4, 122-3, 137-143.
109Ibid., 20-21; Proceedings in Chancery (Rec. Com.), I., lxii-iii, cp.
Spence, op. cit., I., 671-2.
110 Thus Ashburner, Principles of Equity, 494 n. d, suggests that the
writ of estrepment may have formed a model for the injunction; cp.
Hazeltine, Essays in Legal History, 277; but, as Ashburner says, the
writ "became obsolete at an early time."
"'I The development of the equitable jurisdiction over account, and the
manner in which it superseded the older common law jurisdiction, is
analogous; the common law had a writ of account, but the scope of it
was so narrow and the procedure upon it was so cumbrous that it
dropped out; equity filled the gap, so that the modern law is founded
wholly on the principles worked out by equity, see Holdsworth, Hist.
Eng. Law, I., 246. ed. 2, n. i; III., 322-3; Barbour, op. cit., 13-17.
112 The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARv. LAW REv. 261-9.
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are many indications that the English common law in the
time of Bracton might have decided to protect the man on whose
account, or to whose use another holds," 8 it is certain that
it refused to do so.114 The cestui que use was therefore driven
into the Chancery; and his position was worked out by a series
of decisions, firstly, upon the question what were the duties
which a conscientious man in the position of a feoffee to uses
would consider that he owed to the cestui que use; and secondly,
upon the question what persons who had got possession of the
land could be considered to be bound in conscience to fulfill
these duties. As Ames says," 5 "the feoffee to uses, so long
as his obligation was merely honorary, may properly enough be
identified with the German Salman or Treuhand. But the
transformration of the honorary obligation of the feoffee into
a legal obligation was a purely English development" and, we
may add, a development due entirely to the equitable jurisdiction
of the chancellor. Though we must look to the Salman or
Treuhand for the origin of the idea that property could be
entrusted by its owner to a person who was bound to deal with
it according to the wishes of the owner, the shape which that
idea took in English law is wholly the result of the manner in
which the interest -both of the man who thus entrusted the
property, and of the -third persons for whose benefit it was
entrusted, was protected by the chancellor. If the use had
developed in accordance with those equitable ideas which we
can discover in the common law of the thirteenth century, it
would never have developed into that species of equitable own-
ership which is one of the most unique features of English law.
Here again, therefore, continuity between the ideas of the equity
administered by the common law courts and the equity adminis-
tered by the chancellor is conspicuous by its absence.
213 So common was the practice of holding to another's use that in the
first half of the thirteenth century, a jury, after a finding that a certain
Robert held a hundred, could be asked, "ad opus cujus, utrum ad opus
proprium vel ad opus ipsius Ricardi," cited Pollock and Maitland, History
of English Law (ist Ed.), II., 233, from Assize Roll, no. 1182 m. 8.
".4 See the opinion of the judges in 1379 as to the position of the
feoffees under Edward III's will, Rot. Parl., iii, 6o, 2 Rich. II, no. 26; it
is clear that all that the judges would recognise was a condition which was
imposed at the time when the gift was made, and not afterwards, ibid.;
such a condition could not be taken advantage of by anyone but the feoffor
or his heirs, see Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II., 5o4 n. 6.
115 21 HAwV. LAW REV. 265.
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CONCLUSION
The root idea of equity is the idea that the law should be
administered fairly, and that hard cases should so far as possi-
ble be avoided. This idea is common to many system of law
at all stages of their development. 11  It came very naturally
to the mediaeval mind, which regarded the establishment of
justice, through, or even in spite of, the law, as the ideal to be
aimed at by all rulers. It is obvious in the common law of the
thirteenth century. But -the common law hardened too early
into a rigid technical system. During the fourteenth century
the outlook of the judges became narrowed. The increasing
number and technicality of the ordinary forms and processes
of the common law tended to concentrate their attention upon
the working and management of this complicated machinery." 7
They ceased to care so much for those larger principles which,
in the thirteenth century, had made for rapid development.
Moreover they ceased to be so closely identified with the person
of the king that they could assume his prerogative to administer
equity. That prerogative naturally came to be administered by
those courts and officials who acted as the more immediate agents
of the king.
Thus the equitable principles which we can discern in the
common law right down to the beginning of the fourteenth cen-
tury gradually evaporated. It was this fact which made the
intervention of the chancellor necessary. No doubt both the
equity of the common law courts and the equity of the chan-
cellor are both ultimately traceable to the theory that the king
must do justice-even though he interfered with the strict
rules of law. No doubt in the twelfth and thirteenth, as in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the king. administered this
justice through the Council and the courts immediately connected
therewith. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the King's
Bench and the Eyre were closely connected with king and Coun-
cil: in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the Eyre had ceased,
and the King's Bench had lost its close connection with king
and Council. This justice, therefore, came to be administered
by the chancellor, who from that day to this has always been
118 Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, Essays in Legal History,
287-290.
117 Holdsworth, Hist. Eng. Law, II, 502, 503.
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closely connected with the king, and in the Chancery. Thus it
was through the Chancery, and not through the common law
courts, that the stream of equity now flowed. No doubt some of
the equitable ideas which had appeared in the common law
courts in the thirteenth century, reappear in the Chancery-they
had a common ancestor in king and Council. But, because these
equitable ideas flowed through the channel of the Chancery, they
were worked up into a technical system under influences and by
machinery, which were very different from the influences which
affected them and the machinery by which they were administered,
when they flowed through the channel of the common law courts.
The rules evolved in the Chancery were shaped partly by antag-
onism to the rigidity of common law rules; partly by ideas as
to thz function of conscience in determining the morally right,
and therefore the equitable rule, which were borrowed from the
canon lawyers; partly by a procedure, quite different from the
common law procedure, which enabled the chancellor to ascer-
tain what was the equitable course to take in each particular
case. For these reasons the equity developed by the chancellor
took a shape very different from the shape which it would have
taken if it had been developed in the common law courts.
Whether we look at the court which administered it, at the pro-
cedure which that court employed, at the theory upon which
equity was based, or at the contents of the equitable rules, we
see a striking contrast between these two phases in the admin-
istration of equity. It is so striking that we nmust conclude that
our modem system of equity created by the chancellor is, not a
continuation of the equity administered by the common law courts,
but a new, a distinct, and an independent development.
W. S. HoLswoRTH.
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